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THE USE OF ARBITRATION IN THE SETTLEMENT

OF BILATERAL AIR RIGHTS DISPUTES
ROSS T. Dicker

I.

THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
A.

General Organization

In the field of aviation, world transportation is
bound together by.a highly complex and sophisticated arrangement in which each country designates a single carrier to
carry its flag to foreign-countries. The' United States has
not followed this practice of designating one line as the
nation's flag carrier and has twenty "international" carriers
which transport passengers, cargo, and mail to foreign
countries. Each one of these carriers is a private business
concern, competing in most cases with another American carrier
covering the same route, and in all cases with the air
carrier of the country to which it flies. In some cases
1
it also competes with a carrier of a third country.
The competition between the United States carriers,
both domestic trunk and international, 2 for foreign air
routes is keen, as evidenced by the number of major air
carriers who submitted applications for the routes that
were recently granted over the Pacific. 3 The competition
between American and foreign international carriers is also
keen. In 1963, some nineteen air carriers were serving
the North Atlantic market, which is basically the New York
4
to London-Paris route.
Almost every foreign country with its own flag carrier
eagerly seeks to obtain permission to fly to the United
States and to carry passengers over the North Atlantic route. 5

iFor example, Air India and Quantas fly the London to
New York route. London is an intermediary stop between the
United States and India and Australia respectively.
2A domestic trunk line is a major air carrier flying solely
within the U.S., while an international carrier flies between
a foreign country.
the U.S.
3See and
1969 CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD ANNUAL REPORT 15.
4See Pan Am, BOAC Reach Fare Compromise, AVIA. WK. & SP.
TECH., Dec. 9, 1963, at 38.
5 United States citizens make up a major share of international air passengers. The most lucrative routes are those
which traverse the Atlantic. Lissitzyn, Bilateral Agreements
on Air Transport, 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 248, 257, 261 (1964);
New York Times, May 15, 1963, at 11, col. 1.
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These same carriers constantly seek to gain permission to
land at more American cities and, in many cases, to carry
strictly domestic traffic. At the same time, they seek to
have their governments take away routes and rights previously
granted to the United States carriers.
In recent years, American carriers have been complaining
that our government has been too generous to foreign carriers
in granting them such a great share of America's international
air market. United States carrier participation in total
carriage declined from 74 per cent in fiscal 1950 to 54 per
cent in fiscal 1960.6 American carriers have also complained
that several foreign countries have failed to afford equal
and fair treatment to American carriers by subjecting them
to schedule supervision and thereby limiting their ability
to compete.
Consequently the governments of many nations are striving
for a more equitable exchange of economic benefits in the
areas of routes, capacity, and frequency controls for their
countries' carriers.
In 1952 two noted international experts prophesied that
economic controversies would arise concerning such matters
as the regulation of international air transportation.
They stated that the mere settlement of an existing controversy would not be sufficient to avert future controversies.
To accomplish that task, the parties needed to establish
controls at the time the contracts were made which could
operate automatically to check the growth of the controversy. 7
The authors stated that international aviation was an area in
which controversies might be the proper subject of settlement by arbitration. 8
Given the fact that each country seeks as much economic
benefit as possible for its own carrier and conversely seeks
to restrict the benefits given to others, disputes will
naturally occur. These disputes can be legal, economic,
or political in nature. It shall be the object of this note
to determine whether international aviation controversies
lend themselves to adjustment by arbitration as opposed to
the methods of diplomatic negotiation, conciliation, mediation,

6Hearing before the Aviation Subcomm. of the (Senate)
Comm. on Commerce, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 22 (1961).
7 F.
KELLOR & M. DOMKE, ARBITRATION IN INTERNATIONAL
CONTROVERSY
4-5 (1952).
8 Id. at 22.
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and inquiry, which generally comprise the means employed
in international dispute settlement.
B.

History and Regulation

In 1944 the United States called an international
conference on aviation in Chicago to prepare rules and
create institutions for the anticipated expansionist era
of international aviation which the war had made possible.
Some fifty nations attended. At Chicago the nations
formulated general principles of world-wide application
to replace the regional concepts and individual agreements
9
then in existence.
At that time, the United States was in a unique position.
It had the greatest stock of air transportation equipment in
the world, the largest reserve of skilled personnel, substantial world-wide experience in the operation of long-haul
trans-oceanic routes and the economic potential to weld
these characteristics into an aggressively expanding economy.
Most foreign countries were at a low level of economic
development or were so weakened by the war that they were
unable to mobilize sufficient resources to develop an air
transportation fleet to compete with the United States. 1 0
Five agreements came out of the Chicago conference,
but only two deserve special mention. One agreement
established the Provisional International Civil Aviation
11
Organization which was to coordinate and guide aviation.
The PICAO was empowered to settle disputes between its
contracting member-states by arbitration but the parties
first had to attempt a settlement by negotiation.'2 At
this time, "arbitration won its first major entrance into
the field of inter-governmental conventions when it was
adopted."'1 3 The second agreement, the International Air

9 See

31 VA

L

Rhyne, Legal Rules For International Aviation,
REV.

10Hearing,

267,

306

(1945).

supra note 6, at 4.
llhyne, supra note 9, at 307.
1 2 Hingorani,
Dispute Settlement in International Aviation,
14 ARB. J. (n.s.)14, 20 (1959); Sand, Historical Survey of
International Air Law Since 1944, 7 MCGILL L.J. 125, 133 (1960).
1 3 Cooper, New
Problems in International Civil Aviation
Arbitration Procedure, 2 ARB. J. (n.s.) 119 (1947).
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Transport Agreement or the "Five Freedoms" document,
established the framework of commercial aviation which the
14
world has come to recognize.
The United States never supported the final product of
the Chicago Convention because of basic differences of
opinion with Britain, the other major international air
power. Britain and her European neighbors had favored,
and the Convention had established, an international regulatory scheme to control international aviation. The
United States had consistently refused to accept the idea
of giving an international public authority compulsory
jurisdiction over aviation problems, because it was inconsistent with the philosophy of government regulation espoused
in the United States. An international organization, it was
felt, would run the risk of losing detachment when significant
5
national interests were involved.'
Given the magnitude of American participation in international aviation, no international conference could succeed
in its goal of regulating aviation without her support.
Since multilateral attempts failed to produce much needed
regulation, the United States and Britain met in Bermuda,
two years later, to attempt to compromise their widely
divergent views.
The Bermuda Agreement which resulted was a compromise
between the United States and the British philosophy,
yet its principles were essentially those favored by the
United States. Its prime achievement was the granting of
capacity rights adequate for traffic demands between the
country of the air carrier's nationality and the country
of ultimate destination of the traffic.
Capacity was to
14 Rhyne,

supra note 9, at 308. The five freedoms are:
(1) the right to fly across a state's territory without
landing; (2) the right to land in a state's territory for
non-traffic purposes; (3) the right to put down passengers
and cargo taken on in the territory of the state whose
nationality the carrier possesses; (4) the right to take on
passengers and cargo destined for the state of the carrier;
(5) the right of carrying traffic on a route to and from the
state whose nationality the carrier possesses, between two
other states. Lissitzyn, supra note 5, at 248.
1 5 Warner,
Chicago Air Conference: Accomplishments and
Unfinished Business, 23 FOR. AFF. 406, 413, 415 (1944).
16Ybittrie, United States Regulation of Foreign Airlines
Competition, 29 J. AIR L. & COM. 1, 3 (1963).
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bear a close relationship to traffic demands and both
countries were to have a fair and equal opportunity to
operate their designated routes. As a result, the air
carrier of one country was to take into consideration the
interests of the air carrier of the other, so as not to
unduly affect the other's service.
The capacity formula was enumerated in the form of
"the Five Freedoms" which had been developed at Chicago.
The Bermuda Agreement also contained route descriptions
which were designed to limit access of one party to the
traffic of the other. The description would specify
traffic points in the territories of the two contracting
countries and points in other states which could be served
under the agreement. The latter rights have been called
"beyond rights." 1 7 The Bermuda Agreement contained other
less controversial and quite standard provisions.
It is in the area of route description that problems
have arisen because the wording used was too general. Both
countries attempted to make the route descriptions as general
as possible in order to give their carriers leeway in
establishing economically sound service reflecting the
public need. They also desired their carriers to gain
experience in actual operation under peaceful conditions
18
and to be able to later change the routes.
The major problems in international civil aviation
grew out of the framework of the Bermuda Agreement. The
Agreement became the model for some sixty bilaterals which
the United States subsequently executed with other countries
and for some nine hundred and forty bilaterals executed
between other foreign countries. The Bermuda principles
never proved very satisfactory. Present problems have
arisen because small countries conduct far-flung air operations
which have little or no relationship to the size of their
country, their population, or their economy. Such actions
either repudiate the Bermuda principles or represent interpretations of these principles inconsistent with the traditional
American view.
To complicate the problem further, foreign governments
are integrating international air transportation objectives
into their over-all foreign relations posture. Besides
l/Lissitzyn, supra note 5, at 249.
1 8 Stoffel, American
Bilateral Air Transport Agreements
On The Threshold Of The Jet Transport Age, 26 J. AIR L. &
COM. 119, 127 (1959).
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being an instrument of commerce, airplanes are now
considered instruments of national prestige because they
"rshow the flag."' For this reason, governments support their
national airlines to the extent of relating their aviation
objectives to nonaviation matters. To other countries,
international air services can represent a substantial
economic asset with the ability to earn foreign exchange
which is considered essential to the national economy.
KLM is one such carrier. 1 9 Many countries are now seeking
to exploit landing rights previously negotiated although
never utilized, and they are progressively pursuing a policy
of expanding these rights. The United States is a particularly attractive target to them. The wish to have the
flag "seen" has proven to be an enormously expensive proposition. Many carriers cannot meet this expense with the
revenue they produce from the carriage of traffic, because
there are too many air carriers competing for a fairly
stable amount of traffic.
Traditionally the United States has espoused the belief
that freedom in international aviation was the most beneficial and stimulating principle for the development of the
industry. Converseley it was felt that artificial national
restraints on the operation of the air lines was contrary
to American interests and that the scope of air line
operations should be determined by the law of supply and
demand. 2 0 Consequently the American government pushes for
lower air fares while foreign nations push for higher air
fares.
Foreign governments need the higher fares. They realize
that they cannot compete with the larger, more efficient
United States carriers. They do not attempt to make a profit
as the United States carriers do. Foreign carriers are
directly or indirectly an arm of their governments and the
governments realize that any deficit the carrier incurs will
be made up by government subsidies. 2 1 Consequently the success
of an air carrier--its very existence--becomes an important
matter of policy for many governments, with policy consider2
ations superseding economic considerations. 3
19Hearing, supra note 6, at 5.
20Kittrie, supra note 16, at 2.
21Note, Economic Regulation of Foreign Air Carriers By
The C.A.B.: Its Legality and Reviewability, 51 GEO. L.J. 593
(1963).
Id. at 596.
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Foreign carriers have made repeated efforts to gain more
rights in their bargaining with the United States. Both
the newly independent countries who are negotiating air
rights with the United States for the first time and the
countries that signed bilateral agreements with the United
States twenty years ago and are now seeking to renegotiate
those agreements on more favorable terms constantly seek
to expand their air rights.
The hard bargaining position assumed by the newly
independent countries has won from the United States very
extensive air privileges to serve the United States, as
compared to those obtained by the United States in return.
These victories have not been lost on those foreign countries
who gained air privileges from the United States when aviation
was in its infancy. There are also instances where foreign
governments have cut back rights previously granted to the
United States which they considered too lucrative.
Foreign countries have been able to restrict closely the
ability of the United States carriers to compete through
the International Air Transport Association (IATA). The
IATA is actually an international trade association. Included
23
among its 116 members are all major international carriers.
The IATA controls members by a cartel-like group, and it
enjoys immunity from the municipal laws of most of the
individual nations whose carriers are its members. 2 4 In
the United States, the strict control enjoyed by the Civil
Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.) over domestic carriers is not
so absolute in the international area. Since any decision
affecting a foreign carrier could have ramifications on
other areas of foreign policy with the particular nation
involved, the President makes the final determination in any
international aviation matter. 2 5 His determination normally
coincides with the IATA policy in order to avoid disputes.
The IATA meets periodically to solve common problems
and promote the standardization of practices and procedures.
It operates on two levels, the first dealing with interline
traffic, as the airlines themselves work to standardize
tickets, baggage checks, cargo bills, meals, and legroom
2 3 Bebchick,

International Air Transportation Association
And The C.A.B., 25 J. AIR L. & COM. 8, 9 (1958).
2 4 Koffler, IATA:
Its Legal Structure--A critical Review,
32 J. AIR L. & COM. 222

(1966).

25Supra note 21, at 596.
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between seats. The second level deals with fares and rates
to be charged for international air transportation. The
IATA really has no authoritative voice in this area, and
though the carriers are directly involved, they are by no
means free agents. The carriers initially work out fare
agreements because governments realize that carriers must
have some voice in their establishment. An air carrier
negotiates with the knowledge of its government's position.
Since the conference acts only by unanimous agreement, each
carrier retains a veto to protect itself from being forced
to act against its interests.
Resolutions which emerge from the conference meetings
are then submitted to the individual governments which also
have the right to veto any unfavorable resolution. Any
resolution which is vetoed returns to the conference where
it goes through the same negotiation process again.
As long as the nations identify the policies and
interests of their flag carrier with their own national
interest, any resolution of a dispute will entail a compro26
mise with no drastic consequences for any party involved.
It will also insure the maintenance of high fares. Such
action tends to restrict expansion and inhibit the development of a mass market. This forces the carriers into
nonprice competition.
Since foreign carriers are usually government instruments,
their representatives must be looked upon as government agents.
American carriers on the other hand are private corporations
whose representatives are employees of the corporation.
The United States government is not allowed to send official
representatives to the conference meetings, so American
policy is supposed to be presented by the carriers which
have been briefed beforehand.2 7 As will be seen later,
American carriers do not always advocate the official United
States position.
II.

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION DISPUTES

Having examined the tripartite structure of international
civil aviation, it is now appropriate to examine the disputes
that have occurred in each of the three areas and the manner
in which they have been settled.
26Keyes, Making Of International Air Rates And
The
Prospect Of Their Control, 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 173, 188 (1965).
2THearing Before The Subcomm. On Transportation And
Aeronautics Of The House Comm. On Interstate And Foreign
Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1965).
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A.

The ICAO and Arbitration

The Interim Agreement of the Chicago Convention gave
the PICAO an expressly arbitral function "when expressly
requested by all the parties concerned." 2 8 But the disputants first had to attempt a settlement by negotiation
before submitting it to the Council.
In 1952, the Council of the ICAO was faced for the
first time with a dispute between two contracting members,
India and Pakistan. India claimed that Pakistan was denying
her the right to fly over certain parts of Pakistan in
violation of the International Air Services Transit Agreement and Article 5 of the Chicago Convention. 2 9 The area
which Pakistan had declared prohibited lay under an air
route from India to Afghanistan. India contended that the
large area, which by declaration was set aside as prohibited,
was an unreasonable, unnecessary, and non-uniformly
supervised prohibition. India asserted that an Iranian
air carrier was being permitted to conduct regularly scheduled
international service over the area in question.
The Council invited both parties to enter into direct
negotiations. 3 0 On January 19, 1953, representatives
of the two countries announced that the dispute had been
settled by agreement. They stated that the problem had been
solved "amicably" in an "atmosphere of extreme cordiality,"
and that the decision was a "triumph of reason and the good
31
will to see another's point of view."
The India-Pakistan dispute was the first disagreement to
come before the Council of the ICAO. As a dispute settling
mechanism, the Council would seem to have to consider itself
an international judicial organ and act in accord with the
rules of international law governing judicial proceedings.3 2

2 8 Warner,

PICAO And The Development of Air Law, 14 J. AIR
L. & 2 COM.
1, 4 (1947).
9 Prohibited
Areas In International Civil Aviation: Notes
On Article 9 Of The Chicago Convention Of 1944 And The Dispute
Between India And Pakistan, 1953 U.S. & CAN. AVIA. REP. 109,
110-11.
3 0 BIN CHENG,
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 101 (1962).
3 1 Amicable
Settlement Of India-Pakistan Air Dispute, ICAO
BUL. 2 Jan./Feb. 1953, at 26.
BIN CHENG, supra note 30, at 100.
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Yet all the Council did was to invite the parties to enter
into further direct negotiations.
It is impossible to state with assurance why the Council
of the ICAO did not handle this dispute as an international
judicial organ should. Lack of confidence in the process
could certainly be one reason and arbitration had never
been used before in this area.
But more than lack of confidence, it would seem that
the nature and character of the relationship between India
and Pakistan dictated that a formal legal process not be
used. If one could look behind the reason given by Pakistan
for the prohibition--that the lives of passengers and crew
were in danger--the religious and political antipathies
between the two peoplesare plainly evident. History has
demonstrated that such emotional topics are not the proper
subjects for formal legal resolution.
Certainly the "cordial atmosphere" evidenced by both
parties could be explained by Pakistan's realization that
her discriminatory policy would not be supported by an
internationallegal tribunal. Consequently her wisest
course would be to compromise, instead of being ordered
by an international body to remove the prohibition completely.
Such an order would be an embarrassing turn of events.
The Council avoided its dispute-settling function at
that time, because it was essentially a political organization seemingly empowered with a judicial function. 33 It
was composed of twenty-one members who represented their
respective states. It could not function as a judicial
tribunal because its members were versed primarily in the
technological and economic aspects of civil aviation rather
than the legal aspects. 3 4 Also, Article 84 of the Convention
stressed that disputants should first try to settle the con35
flict by negotiation.
B.

The IATA and Negotiation

The following disputes are more typical of the type
which occur in international civil aviation. Although
they are multilateral--taking place among the IATA members-as distinguished from the bilateral ones to be studied
later, the method of settlement is significant.
33Hingorani, supra note 12, at 15.
CHENG, supra note 30, at 104.
35 SHAWCROSS & BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 80 (1961).

3 4 BIN
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In 1958, there occurred what is familiarly called
"The Battle of the Sandwiches." The members of the IATA
had decided that on international flights, economy-fare
passengers would be served only "open sandwiches." European
carriers began serving "open sandwiches" which American
carriers contended amounted to serving a "meal on a piece
36
of bread."
According to an IATA regulation, the carriers were to
serve "simple, inexpensive, cold sandwiches," but Pan
American Airways (PAA) and Trans World Airways (TWA) maintained that Air France, SAS, Swissair, and KLM were serving
a sandwich which was too fancy. 3 7 The dispute was submitted
to the Breached Committee of the IATA which ultimately
issued a decision, stating that the sandwich could be open
or closed, but bread had to be a substantial portion of it.
Additionally, the sandwich had to be cold, simple, and
inexpensive.
The conflict is all the more striking when one considers
the estimated cost of the sandwiches. An economy class
sandwich at that time cost about $.32, and about eight
sandwiches were issued to each passenger on one crossing.
The total comes to above $2.56, plus a few cents more for
a beverage. International carriers spent no more than this
38
per passenger on a one-way flight.
The dispute which took place in 1962 and 1963 must be
one of the most dramatic the IATA has witnessed. In late
1962, the C.A.B. advised United States carriers that it
would not approve any fare increases proposed at the upcoming
IATA conference. The present fare structure was due to
expire on March 31, 1963, and the IATA was to meet in Chandler,
Arizona, to establish a new one. The new schedule, to
become effective April 1, 1963, reflected an increase in fares
by lowering the discount given on round-trip tickets. The
C.A.B. advised the United States carriers not to sign the
resolution.39 This would mean that an open (unregulated and
thoroughly competitive) fare situation would exist after
3 6 Note,

C.A.B. Regulation Of International Aviation,
75 HARV.
L. REV. 575, 578 (1962).
3 7 New
York Times, Apr. 27, 1958, pt. II, at 1, col. 4.
38
1d. at 6.
3 9 Goodwin,
The Role Of The U.S. In The 1963 Transatlantic
Air Fare Crisis, 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 82-83 (1965).
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March 31, a situation foreign carriers had always dreaded.
Informal diplomatic discussions were held between the
United States and Britain. As the American lines were
maintaining the former lower fares, Britain, backed by
other European governments, accused the United States of
violating international law by such action. They consequently
threatened to revoke United States landing rights and to
40
confiscate her planes.
By July 16, 1963, a compromise had been reached, approving
the "Chandler increase" which cut the former discount on a
round-trip ticket from 10 per cent to 5 per cent, but only
for a period of one year. One of the main reasons the C.A.B.
compromised was because the State Department requested it
41
to do so.
To understand the dispute and the reason for the
compromise settlement, the authority of the C.A.B. in
international aviation must be examined. As has been
mentioned, the strict control enjoyed by the C.A.B. over
domestic carriers is absent in the international area.
The bilateral air agreements with foreign countries are
executive aqreements and not treaties. Bilaterals come into
being with the signature of the President alone; the Senate
plays no part. In a hearing before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce in June, 1962, it was stated
during an examination of foreign air transportation that the
C.A.B. had no summary power to stop any carrier in foreign air
transportation from placing into effect any rate, frequency,
or practice it had elected. The C.A.B. is limited to removing
discriminatory practices under Section 1002(f) of the Federal
Aviation Act.4 2 Thus the C.A.B. cannot regulate even United
States carriers by setting just and reasonable rates or by
requiring certain practices. The C.A.B. may make recommendations
to the President, but he has the ultimate authority as to the
official American position.
Abram Chayes, Legal Adviser to the Department of State
during this period, in a hearing before the Senate Committee
40

Id. at 83.
d. at 90.
421 A. CHAYES, T. EHRLICH, A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL PROCESS 495 (1968); Hearing Before the Subcomm. Of The
House Comm. On Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 2 (1962).
41
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on Commerce, stated that the Executive Branch felt it did
not possess the legislative authority required to deal with
problems of this kind. While acknowledging that the
Executive had the right under executive agreements so to
act, he observed that there was simply no power to exercise
many treaty rights. 4 3 Chayes stated that the Executive
would only have the power when Congress, in accord with
constitutional processes, granted the necessary authority.4 4
He noted, however, that foreign countries have the right
to prevent United States carriers from operating in their
territory at any rate which they deem to be unfair and
unreasonable. 4 5
The seriousness of the 1963 fare crisis can be partially
understood from the fact that the previous four years had
been financially rough ones, particularly for the less
efficient foreign carriers. The projected fare increase
would add 300 million dollars to the cost American tourists would
pay, and European carriers wanted to obtain as much of that
as possible. 46
As to why the State Department advised the C.A.B. to
withdraw its objection, Abram Chayes said:
Since May 12, . . . the status of United States

carriers over the Atlantic was likely to be
seriously jeopardized. Threats to those operations
in the form of legal actions or of suspensions of
service were real. . . Continuation of the contro-

versy would redound to the long-term detriment of
the United States interests and international
aviation interests.47
In 1962, it was publicly acknowledged at a House
Hearing that the United States government desired the
IATA to be the primary instrument for the establishment
and maintenance of a sound and fair rate structure for
international air service. 4 8 In 1963, the government,
4 3 Hearings

Before The Senate Comm. On Commerce, 88th
Cong.,lst Sess. 31-32 (1963).
4 4 Id.
at 32.
4 5 Hearings,
supra note 42, at 3.
4 6 New
York Times, May 15, 1963, at 1.
4 7 Hearings,
supra note 43, at 34.
48aring Before Subcommittee, supra note 42, at 3.
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through Mr. Chayes' statement, supported its decision by
action.
A third dispute occurred in 1965. In that year TWA
inaugurated a new passenger service on its international
flights--in-flight motion pictures. The foreign international carriers found that they could not offer a
similar attraction, so they decided to force TWA to
abandon its use. At an IATA conference held in Athens,
Greece, they pressured TWA into removing the movies.
This move was linked to an over-all fare package, together
with the threat that any C.A.B. attempt to protect TWA
would lead to an open-rate situation. The C.A.B.
disapproved the agreement, finding it inconsistent with
49
the public interest.
At a subsequent IATA meeting, it was decided that each
passenger desiring to see in-flight movies would be charged
$2.50 extra. The C.A.B. desired a lower rate but finally
approved the higher one. At present there are many such
resolutions, all approved by the C.A.B., which curtail
50
competition in passenger service.
It is unfortunate that the means of dispute settlement
within the IATA is basically unknown, and available knowledge is based completely on secondary sources. This
conforms with official IATA policy that "some things are
best done behind closed doors." 5 1
C.

The IATA Process

The IATA members meet periodically to establish uniform
rate structures and capacity allowances. This is accomplished by dividing the world into geographical subdivisions
and allowing the carriers which serve those areas to
establish the rate and capacity allowances. Once established
by the "regional conference," the IATA membership as a
whole perfunctorily accepts them.

4 9 Edles,

IATA, The Bilaterals And International Aviation
Policy, 27 FED.B.J. 291, 301 (1967).
5 0 1d.
at 293.
5 1 IATA Delegates
Seek End To Fare Battle, AVIA. WK. &
SP. TECH., Oct. 7, 1963, at 28.
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As previously stated, our government is not allowed
to send officials to conference meetings, so American
policy is presented by the individual carriers which
have been briefed beforehand. The carriers do not
always cooperate. Alan S. Boyd, former Director of the
C.A.B., stated in 1965 that the Board had directed United
States carriers to propose substantial reductions in transPacific economy-class fares at the Athens Conference.
However, the carriers made no effort whatsoever to achieve
52
the objective sought by the Board.
Conference meetings are conducted in secret where
technicians "swap and bargain"--each government negotiating
the rate or capacity allowance. After negotiation, if the
resulting resolution is beyond the range that each govern53
ment will accept, it simply exercises its veto.
Small carriers often complain that the real work is
54
done in hotel rooms from which they are excluded.
Nonetheless, rate setting by unanimous consent leads to a
rate set at the level of the least efficient operators,
usually the smaller ones. This forces carriers into
55
non-price competition.
Many governments feel IATA decisions to be a compromise,
the result of much arms-length bargaining. Given the
difficulty which would result if governments tried to
handle these problems in a bilaterial manner, the multilateral approach should be considered a rather successful
method of avoiding rate wars and an excellent framework
for coordinating the industry's operations. With comparatively few exceptions, international fares are interrelated
and bear a relationship to fares on parallel, overlapping,
or matching routes. The sheer magnitude--60,000 pairs of
points on the air network for which there must be agreement-dictates that multilateral negotiation take place.56
5 2 Hearing,

supra note 27, at 16.
supra note 24, at 230.
54World's Airlines Feud On Fares, BUS. WK., Jan.2, 1960,
at 37.
5 5 Bebchick,
supra note 23, at 16.
561 CHAYES, EHRLICH, LOWENFELD, supra note 42, at 507.
5 3 Koffler,
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Despite the fact that IATA resolutions destroy the
ability of airlines to compete in passenger services, the
result may not be completely harmful. It has been said
that an endless fight over wasteful frills could perpetuate
deficits and cause airlines to neglect earnings, thus
57
leading them down the same path the railroads traveled.
The philosophy of regulation is based on the premise
that chaos and destructive competition will result if no
agreed-upon organization exists. Such drastic events have
failed to materialize when an open-rate situation exists.
The old rates are maintained until a new agreement is
reached.58
The system seems to resolve its problems because
the "will to reach a compromise is present." 5 9 The "will"
is a natural reaction to the threat of chaos if the carriers
do not agree. It is evident that the motivating force
behind the ultimate resolution is never concern for the
60
public's comfort, economy, or convenience.

III.

BILATERALS AND THE USE OF ARBITRATION
A.

The Use of Arbitration

It was recognized in the 1950's that negotiation
provided little help in settling bilateral disputes because
unresolved issues were backlogged. President John Kennedy
directed the Secretary of State in 1963 to establish a
committee to devise a new policy, giving attention to 6 a
1
vital area of foreign policy--international aviation.
On April 24, 1964, the President made this new policy
public. The "new policy" continued to maintain the old
framework of bilateral agreements and advocated continued
support of the Bermuda capacity principles. It also stated
that in an effort to settle future disputes, the government
would resort to consultation, arbitration, and if necessary,
renegotiation and denunciation of the agreement in question.

5 7 Harding,

Mergers Might Save The Airlines, ATLANTIC,
Sept. 1962, at 48.
58 Koffler,
supra note 24, at 234.
59 Sckrey, Overcapacity In The U.S. International Air
Transport Industry, 32 J. AIR L. & COM. 24, 92 (1966).
6 0 Id. at 40.
617etter From President Kennedy to Secretary of State
Rusk, June 22, 1963, in 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 160 (1963).
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While arbitration was mentioned in the first bilateral,
its reiteration by the President in 1964 seemed to indicate
a new attitude and willingness to use it.
There is evidence that in multilateral disputes governments often allowed disputed points to remain unresolved,
accepting an uneasy and precarious truce in the place of
final settlement. By contrast,in the bilateral area, two
disputes have gained a great deal of attention in which
an effort was made to seek a final solution to the problems
involved.
B.

The French Dispute

On March 27, 1946, the United States and France signed
an agreement respecting air transportation service. This
was a bilateral similar to that formed with the British.
Article X of the United States-French Bilateral stated that
disputes not settled by consultation would be referred to
the Interim Council of the PICAO for an advisory report.6 2
The dispute between the United States and France
concerned which cities in certain foreign countries would
properly be included in the term "Near East." The schedule
of routes in the Bilateral listed three separate routes
from France to the Near East over which American carriers
could travel. This type of traffic involved is called "Fifth
Freedom" traffic.
The description of "Route One" stated that a United
States carrier could proceed "over the North Atlantic to
Paris and beyond via intermediary points in Switzerland,
63
Italy, Greece, Egypt and the Near East . . . and beyond."

6 2 Agreement

with the Provisional Government of the French
Republic Relating to Air Services Between their Respective
Territories, March 27, 1946, art. X, 61 Stat. 3445, 3452.
This directs the reader to art. III, § 6(8), Interim Agreement
on International Civil Aviation, 59 Stat. 1521, which states
that, when expressly requested, the PICAO shall act as an
arbitral
body.
6 3 Id. at 3466.
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Section VII of the Annex to the Bilateral stated that changes
in the route could be made by either party and that they
would not be considered as a modification of the Annex.
However, the aeronautical authority of the country making
the change had to notify without delay the aeronautical body
64
of the other contracting party.
The dispute which arose in 1963 may only be understood
from briefly examining the history of U.S.-French air
relations after 1946. In 1950, the C.A.B. granted Pan
American permission to compete with TWA on Route One
serving Paris and beyond. Pan American informed France
that its service would go from Paris to Rome and Beruit.
Since Beruit was not specifically mentioned in Route One,
France ob ected to its inclusion on Route One service out
of Paris. 5Despite its reservation, France ultimately
allowed that airline to serve Beruit.
In 1955, Pan American notified France that it intended to
extend its service from Beruit to Tehran, Iran. France
objected, claiming that the city was not within the "Near
East" as stated in Route One, but within the Middle East.
Under a "temporary" permit, France subsequently allowed
an extension of service to Tehran.
In the same year, Pan American extended its service
to Istanbul and Ankara, but only after France stipulated
that no passengers could be embarked in Paris and disembarked
in the two Turkish cities, or embarked in Turkey and disembarked in Paris. France claimed that Turkey was not explicitly
part of Route One and therefore not included in "beyond"
rights from Paris. France maintained that Turkey was within
"Route Two." Thus, the airline operated between Paris and
Istanbul--later Ankara also--without embarcation rights
to or from Paris.
In 1961, Pan American notified the French that it was
going to substitute Tehran for Bagdad on some Paris-IstanbulBagdad flights. France declared that Pan American had no

6 4 Id.

at 3462.
Arbitration of the United States-France Air
Traffic Rights Dispute, 30 J. AIR L. & COM. 231 (1964).
It is also stated that old political and cultural French
ties with Lebanon were influential in France's desire to
keep PAA (U.S.) out of Beruit.
6 5 Larsen,
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rights to fly beyond Istanbul. At the same time, the
"temporary" permission to fly between Paris and Tehran via
Istanbul expired. Negotiations between the two governments
ensued but soon deadlocked. On October 12, 1962, the United
States notified France that it desired arbitration under
Article X.
The problems involved in this dispute were to some
degree influenced by the policies of the IATA. The
association had divided the world into three regions,
called Traffic Conferences. The Second Traffic Conference
encompassed Europe, Africa, and the Middle East, including
Iran.
The regional concept was embodied in the ultimate
routes drawn up in 1946. The schedule described air routes
generally within a region, so that specific points could be
changed as the demands of traffic changed. The general
wording was ill-suited to a situation in which there
would ultimately be competition. The need for city-by-city
designation of air routes in the "Near East" was not
realized because the commercial value of traffic rights
had not been recognized; global air transportation was young.
In 1963, France and the United States drew up a document
outlining the manner in which the issues would be arbitrated.
Its object was to insure a more orderly basis for arbitration
and, since it does not supersede Article X of the 1946
Agreement, it must be read in conjunction with it.
Before the Tribunal, both parties orally agreed that the
Arbitration Agreement should be given a broad interpretation.6 6
The case was argued by the governments of both carriers
although the airlines were the real parties. The United
States government, since 1943,-has conducted the negotiation
of all our bilaterals. Before then the airlines secured
their own transportation rights. Larsen states that because
of the strong private interests involved, the proceedings
still assume the character of commercial arbitration between

6 6 Prof.

Paul Reuter--French designee; Prof. Milton Katz-U.S. designee (later succeeded by Prof. Henry de Vries);
Prof. Roberto Ago--selected by the President of the ICJ when
designees of the two countries could not decide on the third
member. This is an ad hoc tribunal and not the institutional
type that was envisioned in the original bilateral.
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two airlines. Thus the scope of the arbitration was to
include the words describing Route One, all formal and
informal understandings which the parties had later entered,
and their respective practices. This liberal scope of
jurisdiction would allow the Tribunal to incorporate
equitable considerations into its decision.
Although Article X only called for an advisory opinion,
both parties explicitly bound themselves to accept any
decision from the Tribunal as final and binding.
The exact issues before the Tribunal were:
Under the . . . Air Transportation Service Agreement
* * . and in . . . Route One. . . , does a United States

airline have the right to provide international
aviation services between the United States and Turkey
via Paris and does it have the right to carry traffic
(between Paris and Istanbul or Ankara in Turkey)?
Under the . . . Air Transportation Service Agreement
. . . and in . . . Route One . . . , does a United

States airline have the right to provide international
aviation services between the United States and Iran
via Paris and does it have the right to carry traffic
67
(between Paris and points in Iran)?
As mentioned, the dispute concerned the geographical
It was to be
area to be included in the term "Near East."
the Tribunal's task to draw from the Agreement the contractual
meaning given to the term and to find the common intention
of the parties. France claimed and the Tribunal agreed, that
"Near East" has no generally agreed-upon meaning in geography,
history, diplomatic language, or aviation usage. Any meaning
would have to come from the context of the bilateral.
Adhering to that belief, the Tribunal construed the sequence
in which "Near East"appeared in the route description to
indicate what the negotiators meant by the term. The
6 7 Bishop,

Decision of the Arbitration Tribunal Established Pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement Signed at Paris
January 22, 1963, Between the United States of America and
France, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 1016, 1017 (1964).
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Tribunal decided that "Near East" encompassed an area
between Egypt and Pakistan-India. This was a general
description which followed a more or less uniform
direction from east to west. "Near East" signified a
general geographical region in which a point or series
of points ought to be situated, but all were to be
equally characterized because they were intermediate
points between the countries mentioned. The resulting
configuration resembled a vast air corridor which was the
general path of the route. The route constituted a series
of points and not states or regions. It is the points
which are to be served by the air carriers.
This general path, being flexible, comprised a
number of possible service patterns whose choice was
left to the state whose carrier had the-right to service
the route. As the region involved had boundaries which
were not well defined, service was to be limited to intermediary points along the fundamental direction of the
route.
The Tribunal concluded that the area between Turkey
and India was not within the general description of Route
One. The schedule in the Bilateral had described Route
Two as a path over the North Atlantic to Marseille,
Milan, Budapest, "to Turkey and thence via intermediate
points to a connection with Route Eight." 6 8 The Tribunal
found no intention to merge Route One with Route Two
because it had not been expressly provided for. It did
find expressly stated a provision for the merger of Route
One with Route Three. The Tribunal assumed, then, that
the intention must have been to separate the two areas
69
described in Route One and in Route Two.
Section VII permitted the parties to make route changes
only if within the general path of a route. Thus the
three cities in question could not be added because they
were outside the general path of the route. In determining
what "changes" meant, the Tribunal followed the French
6 8 Agreement

with the Provisional Government of the French
supra note 62, at 3466.
Republic,
6 9 Bishop, supra note 67, at 1021.
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version and interpreted modification to mean small alterations.70
In examining the subsequent practice of the parties,
the Tribunal found support for its interpretation because
France had never agreed to the American position including
the three cities within-Route One nor had she consented to
the change under Section VII. But the French failed to
persist in their refusal to recognize Pan American's
right to serve Beruit and Tehran. By failing to persist,
the Tribunal found French consent to the legality of the
service. Thus, independent of the 1946 Agreement, France
gave Pan American permission to serve Tehran. Although
the 1955 permit had been termed temporary, the long service
enjoyed by Pan American and the responsibility involved
in initially granting permission created a vested right.
Thus Pan American could serve Turkey via Paris because
of the 1955 Agreement. It could also serve Iran via Paris
because of the 1955 Agreement. It could also serve Iran
via Paris because these rights accrued from French consent
and subsequent practice. The Tribunal found that Pan
American could enjoy no commercial traffic rights between
Paris and Turkey because permission to serve Turkey did
not include such rights. Pan American did have commercial
rights to serve Tehran by French consent and subsequent
practice. Once these rights had vested, they could not be
contested until they were violated.
The Tribunal also decided that Pan American had the
right to serve Beruit. Although this had not been one of
the questions submitted for determination, it was closely
related to Tehran service, and the Tribunal incorporated
this in the comprehensive decision because the parties had
been liberal in the scope of jurisdiction granted.
C.

The Italian Dispute

The Air Transportation Agreement between the governments
of the United States and Italy was signed on February 6,
1948, establishing aviation service between the two countries.
Article 12 of the Agreement dealt with dispute settlement
and stated:
7 0 Larsen,

supra note 65, at 241.
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Any dispute relative to the interpretation or
application of the present Agreement or Annex,
which cannot be settled through consultation,
shall be submitted for an advisory re ort to a
7i
tribunal of three arbitrators ....
The basis of the dispute with Italy concerned the
meaning of Section III of the Annex to the Bilateral.
That section stated that the designated carriers were
to enjoy the rights of commercial entry and departure
for international traffic in passengers, cargo, and
mail. 7 2 The final settlement of the dispute could have
had an important effect on all the other bilaterals
which the United States had entered since they were
similarly worded. The interpretation given would influence
their interpretation should any future dispute arise.
As with France, the history of air relations with
Italy since 1946 must be examined. Trans World Airways
had started to serve Italy in that year under a temporary
permit. In 1947 it initiated all-cargo service. It
had previously offered only a combination of passenger,
cargo, and mail service. Under the 1948 Agreement, TWA
continued to serve Italy. In 1950, the C.A.B. authorized
Pan American to fly to Italy, and Italy authorized Alitalia
to fly to the United States.
Trans World ceased its all-cargo flights in 1950 and
did not resume them until 1958. In 1959 it increased its
flights from one to four a week. Pan American initiated
all-cargo service in 1960 and, by 1963, had two flights a
week. In 1961 Alitalia began all-cargo flights and, by
1963, it had three flights a wqek.
To meet the increasing traffic, Pan American decided
to increase the number of weekly flights to four and it, as
73
well as TWA, planned to use jet transports on the flights.
The Italian government was notified of the impending changes
7 1 Air

Transport Agreement with the Government of Italy,
Feb. 6, 1948, art. 12, 62 Stat. 3729, 3726.
7 2 Annex to
the United States-Italian Agreement, § III,
62 Stat. 3740.
7 3 Larsen, United
States-Italy Air Transport Arbitration:
Problems of Treaty Interpretation and Enforcement, 61 AM. J.
INT'L L. 496, 499. This still had the effect of doubling
cargo capacity.
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in July, 1963, Alitalia could not meet this increase in
service because it lacked the equipment. Italy then
refused to allow these changes, claiming that all-cargo
service was unauthorized by the 1948 Agreement which only
allowed service combining passengers, cargo, and mail.
The dispute came to a head when on December 3, 1963,
TWA announced that it was going to implement exclusively
jet flights on its all-cargo runs, but that it would not
increase the number of weekly flights. 7 4 Italy stated
that there could be no increase in capacity either by
increasing the number of flights or by using the newer
and larger equipment, thus still contending that all-cargo
service was outside the 1948 Agreement.
After fruitless consultation, both parties agreed to
seek arbitration of the dispute under Article 12. This
took place on March 23, 1964. The Arbitral Tribunal
formed only received a narrow grant of jurisdiction, being
asked to decide the dispute solely on the basis of the
1948 Agreement.
The issue to be resolved was:
Does the Air Transport Agreement between the
United States and Italy . . . grant the right

to a designated airline of either party to
75
operate scheduled flights carrying cargo only.
As in the French dispute, the parties met beforehand
to agree on arbitration terms. Those terms were incorpormust
ated in a Compromis signed on June 30, 1964, which
76
clause.
arbitral
the
with
conjunction
in
be read
The Tribunal began its examination with Section III
of the Bilateral, which contained the phrase "passengers,
cargo, and mail" service, but it had to widen its scope
to include Sections I and II. This was done because "the
context is constituted by the body of the provisions of the
Agreement with which the text is logically related," and
7 4 Id.

at 500. The 1948 Agreement did not permit predetermination of traffic capacity. Annex, supra note 72

§§ viT & Ix.

7 5 Bradley,

International Air Cargo Services: The
Italy-United States Air Transport Agreement Arbitration,
12 MCGILL L.J. 312, 316 (1966).
7 6 Larsen, supra
note 73, at 501.
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Sections I and II grant rights to conduct air transportation
services. 7 7 Article I of the Bilateral stated that Article
96 of the Chicago Convention would supply any definitions
not found in the Bilateral. In examining Article 96, the
Tribunal discovered the phrase "passengers, cargo, or mail."
After comparing "or" and "and" in the two versions, the
Tribinal discarded the former because its formula was
different from the 1948 formula. The Tribunal was at first
content to base its interpretation on only the wording
involved. With the aid of expert language advice, the
Tribuna l decided that "and" was a conjunction having a
cumulative meaning, not an alternative one. This would
mean that grammatically, all-cargo service was not allowed,
but the Tribunal decided that the text granted a right and
did not impose an obligation to conduct such service.
Considering the general nature of air services, the
Tribunal stated that the exclusion of all-cargo service
would be absurd. The Italian contention would mean that
if planes did not have all three commodities on board,
they could not disembark persons or property in Italy.
78
Since the service was not excluded, it must be included.
In looking at the legislative history of the 1948
Bilateral, the Tribunal had to look at the 1946 Bermuda
Agreement which was designed to regulate all scheduled
air transportation. Since all-cargo service was neither
specifically included nor excluded, it was considered to
be implicitly included.7 9 The Tribunal found support for
this position in a 1948 news release from the Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that the Bermuda Agreement was the basis of the 1948 Italian Agreement.
The Tribunal then stated that in 1949 Italy had had
an obligation to expressly exclude all-cargo service, if
that was her intention, in order not to deceive the United
States.
In looking at the subsequent condint of the parties,
the Tribunal observed American all-cargo service from 1948

7 7 Italy-U.S.

Air Transport Arbitration: Advisory Opinion
of Tribunal, July 17, 1965, 4 INT'L LEGAL MATER. 974, 979.
7 8 Larsen,
supra note 73, at 507.
79
Id. at 508.
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to 1963, with a break between 1950 and 1958, and Italian
cargo service come into existence in 1961. As neither
party had sought special permission to initiate this
service, the Tribunal had to conclude that the 1948
80
Agreement was designed to cover all-cargo service.
Unlike the decision handed down by the Tribunal in
1963, this was not a unanimous decision. The arbitrator
selected by the Italians wrote a dissenting opinion,
finding permission to handle all-cargo service outside
the scope of the 1948 Agreement.
Also unlike the 1962 instance, the losing party chose
not to accept the adverse decision. Italy denounced the
Agreement when a United States carrier attempted to
81
implement all-cargo service.
D.

Politics and Arbitration

The new International Air Transportation Policy called
for the use of arbitration to settle disputes. It can
be discerned, however, that arbitration would not be used
across the board in all disputes. By affirming continued
support, subject only to United States "pressure" and
"influence," the United States recommitted itself to a
policy it had basically followed for twenty years. 8 2
The arbitration with France was a direct result of a
change in the United States attitude concerning one small
area. The arbitration with Italy was a reflection of the
confidence gained in a procedure shown to be successful
only a year before.
In a multiparty situation the use of negotiation will
continue and the number of multiparty situations may
increase. G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary for
Economic Affairs, stated recently that the new policy
8 0 Id.

at 510.

The majority decision was written by
Metzger and Riese. Larsen states that the presence of these
two on the Tribunal characterizes it as one possessing
specialized knowledge. Monaco wrote the minority decision.
Id. at
8 1 503.
Id. at 516.
8 2 -Sckrey,
supra note 59, at 50.
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statement accepts the reality that international aviation
will not be able to operate in a wholly unregulated environment. 8 3 If this is so, it means that governments will
enter the arbitration arena more frequently.
In the same policy statement, the United States government said that it would try to obtain a "realistic division"
of the market between the United States and foreign carriers,
so long as United States residents predominate among air
travelers. However, what is realistic to the United States
will not automatically be realistic to a foreign government
trying to enhance the position of its own airline. In
multiparty situations governments are already present,
given the IATA procedure. Even in more limited party
situations, governments will be present in order to gain
better routes for their lines. Given the fact that the
United States carriers are constantly seeking to expand
their service, the United States has been and will continue
to be forced to surrender more than its carriers receive,
simply because the American market is more lucrative than
those in which American carriers seek entry rights.
The presence of foreign governments places politics
in the middle of what should essentially be business considerations. Given the status of foreign carriers as
governmental instruments, the resolution of business problems
must be guided by governmental policy. In some cases
foreign governments can force concessions from the United
States by restricting the capacity or frequency status of
American air carriers, since their aeronautical authorities
have the necessary power. 8 4
The United States cannot always employ arbitration
because it does not have the legal power to match the
economic power its carriers generate in international
aviation.
If it is true that, by its nature, international
aviation is bound up with fundamental issues of national
sovereignty and with international relations generally, 8 5
then the President will continue to make final determinations
in matters of foreign air transportation to protect the
8 3 Johnson,

International Aviation Policy of the United
States, 49 DEP'T STATE BULL. 509 (1963).
84Letter from Mr. Elihu Schott to Ross T. Dicker, Feb.
25, 1969.
8 5 johnson,
supra note 83, at 508.
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delicate matters of foreign relations involved.
The use of arbitration in a large multilateral situation
is unlikely. The two instances of such arbitration demonstrate that when it has been used, a small number of parties
were involved. There can be no unilateral or bilateral
control of air fares because the interests of more than one
nation are always involved and many carriers often travel
the same route. 8 6
In a limited party situation, arbitration is more
likely to be used and used successfully. Bermuda Agreements
state that each signator has the exclusive power to determine
the port of entry into its own state and the routes to and
from its shores. A third country cannot influence this
type of decision and theoretically has no interest in the
determination.
A Bermuda Agreement grants rights which declare what
the relationship between the parties shall be. Although
a conflict may contain political and economic considerations,
any final decision will probably conform to the written
agreement which defines the relationship. If arbitration
is employed, the arbitrator will be confined to the subject
in dispute. To reach a decision he will look to the written
agreement, previous conduct, and to legislative history.
In all probability, he will not be concerned with the
inability of one party to compete because of a lack of
comparable equipment or the inability to compete at a lower
fare. He will try to determine what the words of the
agreement mean and what the parties intended them to mean.
A Bermuda Agreement does not control rates. In a rate
situation, a dispute would not be based on a previous
understanding, but on a government's national interest and
policy. These are not appropriate factors to submit to
an "objective" third-party decision-maker.
Price-fixing within the IATA will continue to be
successful as long as it continues to hold its membership.
In a geographical sense, it is successful only when the
governments of a particular area give strong support to
IATA resolutions and machinery. For that reason, Europe
with its ardent and enthusiastic governmental supporters of

86 Sckrey, supra note 59, at 87.

151

IATA, is a tightly controlled area in all phases of international aviation. The Western Hemisphere, especially
South America, has not unanimously backed the IATA. As
a result, air fares in that area are much lower than
87
corresponding IATA fares over similar distances.
An international aviation authority currently employed
by Pan American has stated that most of the diputes which
have arisen have involved more than isolated matters of
interpretation of agreements. Consequently, while arbitration can be used to settle some issues, he feels that
there are many issues which will still require the use of
negotiation. 8 8 The failure of arbitration in the Italian
dispute shows that the issues are often inseparable,
and thus arbitration will not always be a final, definitive
answer.
The failure of the Italian arbitration deserves
attention. There are numerous possible explanations as
to why arbitration with France was successful but not with
Italy. The arbitration with France was settled by a unanimous
decision; that with Italy was not unanimous, but two to one
in favor of the United States position. It has been stated
that the unanimity of the French decision demonstrates
that the arbitrators probably worked among themselves to
convince each other of the proper solution. 8 9 In the
Italian case, it has been stated that the decision was
entirely free of compromise. 9 0 This failure to compromise
may have forced the Italian member to dissent and the
Italian government to reject the decision. If the arbitrators
had been able to integrate non-legal factors into their
decision-making process, the outcome might have been different.
Italy could not abide by the decision because she could not
ultimately compete with the United States.
In examining the Italian situation, Larsen has stated
that a unanimous award may have a stronger effect than one
with a dissenting opinion. This seems to be true, but
possibly for reasons that are not readily apparent.
In examining the French example, Larsen stated that
private arbitration in which an ad hoc instead of an
institutional tribunal is used is quite close to negotiation.
8 7 Keyes, supra
8 8 Letter,

note 26, at 175-76.
supra note 84.
8 9 Larsen,
supra note 65, at 244.
9 0 Larsen,
supra note 73, at 514.
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This is especially true when a unanimous award is presented.
Larsen believes that the French decision reflects favorably
upon the effectiveness of arbitration in such agreements.
This is questionable if, as he states, it is so similar
to negotiation. Negotiation is as political as arbitration
is legal. The French decision does not appear to be such
a success for the arbitration process if what was ultimately
used was a form of negotiation. If arbitration cannot work,
it should not be inserted in an agreement as a possible
alternative to negotiation.
E.

Law and the Function of Arbitration

Conflicts between states can be economic or political,
but either can be treated in a legal manner. The role that
law plays in international affairs is neither greater nor
lesser than the part which it plays in national affairs.
International legal disputes involve claims based upon
positive international law. In solely political disputes,
claims are based on non-legal principles or no principles
whatsoever. The legal or political character of a conflict
depends exclusively upon the discretion of the parties.
If the conflict is legal in nature, an objective
examination and unbiased resolution of the question of
whether or not the law has been violated is the most essential
91
stage in the legal procedure.
Arbitration is a quasi-judicial process even in the
international area, because the tribunal acts similarly
to a court of law. When parties employ arbitration, they
refer the controversy to impartial persons for a decision
which the parties beforehand agree to accept as final and
binding, though in the area of international aviation
the decision sought is most often advisory. The arbitrators
judge the merits of the controversy by gathering evidence
at hearings. What is most noteworthy is that the process
cannot be instituted without the prior voluntary consent of
the parties. No state can be forced to arbitration without
92
its consent.
9 1 Kelsen,

Compulsory Adjudication of International
Disputes, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 397-404 (1943),.
9 2 F.

ELLOR & M. DOMKE, supra note 7, at 37-38.
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As can be discerned from the existence of arbitration
in international aviation agreements for twenty years,
there is a great difference between having agreed to settle
future disputes by arbitration and actually deciding to
invoke its use. The invocation requires a positive attitude,
93
confidence in its fairness, and a definite act.
Previous conflicts in the area of international air
fares resulted from negative attitudes and desires to insulate
one's own air carrier as much as possible from the strains
of competition. A change in the dispute-settling machinery
without a change in attitude would gain nothing. 9 4 Previous
instances in which the United States has disapproved of IATA
recommendations have met with negligible success and will
so continue, until attitudes change. IATA disagreements
are fraught with emotional issues, because reduced fares
and expensive passenger services could terminate the
existence of carriers of young, developing countries. It
is difficult to balance their special interests with the
United States' desire for competition. In international
aviation disputes thus far the parties have based their
claims on political factors.
1. Advantages to the Use of Arbitration. There are
numerous advantages to the use of arbitration, making it
an attractive means of dispute settlement. Today, informed
sources seem to think that impartial international arbitration
is the most feasible means of solving some foreign disputes. 9 5
Is it also feasible in international aviation disputes?
International law is not so rich in the machinery of settlement that it can afford to neglect any new means that may
96
have some prospect of success.
Arbitration is less cumbersome and speedier than
judicial settlement. It is more concerned with common
sense and justice, and less concerned with political nuances
97
than diplomacy, mediation, or conciliation.
9 3 Larsen,
9 4 Keyes,

supra note 65, at 245.
supra note 26, at 174.
9 5 Snyder, Foreign
Investment Protection: Is Institutional
Arbitration The Answer?, 40 U.N.C.
9 6 johnson,

L. REV. 665, 667

(1962).

The Constitution Of An Arbitral Tribunal,
30 BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 152, 174 (1953).
9 7 Snyder,
supra note 95, at 669.
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The arbitration procedure certainly seems quite simple.
There have been only two parties before the Tribunal as
opposed to some one hundred sixteen carriers involved in
IATA Conferences. For each nation at a Conference there
are varied interests, policies, and legal practices which
will play some part in the final resolution.
Arbitration insures flexibility in the choice of the
arbitrators and an assurance that the men chosen will have
some expertise in the subject. 9 8 Because of the balanced
composition of the tribunal, objectivity can be obtained
to a greater extent than is possible in an IATA Conference.
At these Conferences, most carriers are represented by
government agents who act as both advocates and decisionmakers, and whose interest in commerce is secondary to
their interest in governmental policy.
Arbitration is characterized by an air of informality.
This is also a result of the small number of interested
parties involved and the practice of the parties in
determining the procedure to be followed, which appears in
a separate agreement drawn up prior to the actual arbitration. IATA Conferences lack informality because of
the large number of interested parties and the great influence
held by the major carriers.
99
Privacy can also be achieved through arbitration.
IATA Conferences can achieve a type of privacy, because it
seems to be IATA policy to conduct meetings in secret.
Indeed, the C.A.B. has long complained that it is unable
to gain any specific information from either domestic or
foreign carriers about the nature of IATA business. It is
claimed that the 1963 fare dispute started because neither
Pan American nor TWA would give the C.A.B. justification
for their fare increases.-I 0 0
Arbitration is known for its low cost. Each side
merely pays for its expenses and one-half the cost of the
Tribunal. Costs of IATA conferences are much higher
because the conferences are held in resort hotels, in a
convention atmosphere, with the attendant high prices.
9 8 Larsen,
9 9 Sand,

supra note 73, at 519.
International Unification of Air Law, 30 LAW &
PROB. 400, 402 (1965).
CONTEMP.
1 00Sckrey, supra note 59, at 42
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An important aspect of arbitration is the fact that
the parties are before the Tribunal voluntarily. Arbitration is said to connote cooperation. As noted earlier,
negative attitudes shackle the IATA. Since one vote can
defeat a resolution, cooperation and acquiescence are
difficult to obtain unless the least efficient carrier is
satisfied.
Arbitral tribunals may also have a wider area of
jurisdiction. Traditionally in international law, the
tribunal has been able to determine the limits of its
own jurisdiction as well as its own procedure. I 0 1
The French Tribunal was given wide powers of discretion
by the disputants, while the Italian Tribunal was given
narrow ones. The Italian Tribunal was forced to go beyond
the area granted it in order to make its ultimate decision.
The IATA will not consider either the public needs or
desires or what the airlines can reasonably accomplish.
Arbitration is not inflexibly bound by law. It allows
the parties to tell their story in their own way, unhampered by rules of evidence.1 0 2 Yet, arbitration awards
should not fly in the face of traditional legal principles,
because such action will destroy the confidence which
arbitration must instill in order to win adherents. An
element of equity, in the Western sense of the word, seems
to allow the arbitrators to consider non-legal factors.
Such non-legal factors may play a very important part in
regular commercial arbitration between private parties.
The part that they play in aviation arbitration is unknown,
unless they are manifested in the form of international
custom, as evidence of general practice, and of certain
general principles of law recognized by most civilized
nations. The latter two factors constitute forms of law
utilized in the International Court of Justice, 1 0 3 and
are also similar to Western principles of equity. Even with
these non-legal considerations, there is no indication that
the arbitrators do not feel bound by precedent. I0 4 In fact,
10 1 Larsen,

supra note 73, at 504.
102 Kellor, The Science of Arbitration--A Speedy Way to
Peace
and Security, 1 ARB. J. (n.s.) 18,20 (1946).
...03I.C.J.
STAT. art. 38(b),(c).
1 0 4 Crane,
Arbitral Freedom Prom Substantive Law, 14 ARB.
J. (n.s.) 163, 171-72 (1959).
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both the Italian and French experience demonstrate that
the 'tribunals will frequently refer to other arbitrations
to show that their interpretive methods were based on
international law.
2. Disadvantages of Arbitration. It is claimed
that partiality is common to private arbitration because
each side selects one of the arbitrators. The Italian
experience seems to support this claim since the Italian
appointee supported the Italian argument. Yet, arbitration
will function because of the third member. He seems to
be the key to its success. It should also work because
of the expertise of the members, which should counterbalance
any contention that the individual appointments are representatives of their state. The French experience would
seem to show that a national can be impartial. Complete
impartiality could be gained from institutional arbitration,
but that form does not seem popular. Complete impartiality
105
may not, however, always be sought.
One of the major disadvantages of arbitration
is the lack of any enforcement machinery once the award
has been given. In the IATA process, recalcitrant members
can be denied landing rights at the airports of each member
state. That Italy ultimately denounced the Agreement and
implicitly the arbitrator's decision casts grave doubt on
the dispute-settling capacity of the arbitration process.
1 06
Italy just could not compete with United States carriers.
A private observer has stated that "without a ready means
of enforcing . . . [an] arbitral decision, the United States
1 07
has no recourse but negotiation. 1
What is the record of compliance with arbitral
decisions, considering this lack of enforcement machinery?
It has been stated that few disputes get to arbitration
unless the parties are prepared in advance to abide by
any foreseeable decision which the tribunal may render.
Consequently, certain important conflicts which really
matter are not automatically submitted to arbitration,

1 0 5 Larsen,
106

supra note 73, at 518.
Letter, supra note 84.
107
1d.
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because each party would have to be reconciled to the
1 08
possibility of losing the case.
The record of compliance with international decisions
is not a good one. A survey of international arbitration
between 1794 and 1938 shows that almost 15 per cent of
the arbitrations noted were not complied with.1 0 9
Such a history is certain to have an impact on tribunals
and is very likely to influence the content of the ultimate
decisions. Enforcement is a problem which must be recognized, as it was in the Italian situation. There, the
majority of the Tribunal realized that the decision might
brought about
not be fair and equitable. This ultimately
11 0
a renegotiation of the 1948 Agreement.
Why did Italy submit to arbitration? By the terms of
the Agreement, she was bound by good faith to submit,
once the United States invoked its use. Italy may have
been buying time until she could acquire planes. There
is, however, a more fundamental problem.
[T]he question of the distinction between legal
and political disputes, especially between arbitral
and non-arbitral disputes, is one which, until
resolved to the satisfaction of a majority of
governments, must necessarily reduce the efficience
of international arbitration, judicial or otherwise.
[It will] greatly enhance the difficulty of securing
of international disputes
agreement on a settlement
111
law.
to
according
In determining why arbitration failed to solve the
Italian dispute, Larsen may have touched-upon the problem
when he noticed that in the French situation, the arbitrators
1 0 8 Reisman,

The Role of the Economic Agencies in the

Enforcement of International Judgments and Awards: A
Functional Approach, 19 INT'L ORG. 929 ; Sloan,
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in International Agencies,
3 ARB.
J. (n.s.) 134, 135 (1948).
1 09 Reisman,
supra note 108, at 930.
1 1 0Italy-U.S.
Air Transport Arbitration, supra note 77,
at 99'[Johnson,
J,9
supra note 96, at 176.
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"appear to have approached the issue with open sensibilities,
allowing themselves wide discretion to consider any relevant factors.",1 1 2 He feels this approach was not used in the
Italian situation where he believes the arbitrators failed
to see that the crux of the problem was not the word "rand,r
but rather the design of the 1948 Agreement efficiently to
distribute air transportation. Larsen correctly notes that
there are "'economic and sociological elements involved
which are not stated in the text . . . national air power,

distribution and gain of wealth, ease of transportation
and prestige."1 1 3 These are the real problems and the
arbitrators need to recognize them.
Metzger, on the other hand, discounts the presence
of such problems. 1 14 It is true that not all the factors
are always present, but certainly economic motives played
a greater role in the "real" problem with Italy than they
seem to have in the French situation. France's interest
in the Middle or Near East goes back two centuries, and
her concern with American air power may stem from her desire
to preserve her political influence. For some reason, the
changing of American air routes was much less crucial to
France than the increase in all-cargo flights was to Italy.
This seems to explain the difference between the success
in the French case and the failure in the Italian case.
F.

Components of Successful Arbitration

Was arbitration really a failure in the Italian experience?
Had the parties previously committed themselves to follow
whatever decision was handed down?
Larsen stated that the Tribunal handed down an "arbitral
decision," as was agreed upon in the Compromis1 5 and not
an "advisory report." In other words, this was not merely
advice that was being rendered. This result would seem to
indicate that, similarly to the normal judicial process,
the parties were bound to follow the decision. consequently,
the renunciation of the Agreement marks the experience as a
failure, at least from outward appearances.
1 1 2 Larsen,

supra note 73, at 512.

1 1 3 id

.
1 1 4 Metzger,

Treaty Interpretation and the United StatesItaly Air Transport Arbitration, 61 AM. J. INT'L L. 1007-09 (1967).
i±DLarsen, supra note 73, at 515.

159

What does it take for the arbitral process to be
successful? The arbitrators in the French situation were
international law experts. Those in the Italian situation
were international aviation experts. In the French situation,
both parties claimed victory; the French because their
argument was accepted and the Americans because they were
allowed to continue serving the cities in question. In the
Italian situation, only one side was able to claim the
victory, while the other side was forced to denounce the
award.
It must be remembered that the arbitrators in the
Italian dispute were asked to discover what the words
of the 1948 Agreement meant. That result they accomplished.
They left the original Agreement intact and did not try to
write a new one or amend the old one. That the parties
could not live with the decision should not reflect
badly on the Tribunal, because the parties did not ask
the arbitrators to find a solution which both sides could
live with.
The fact that Italy was unable to live with the
Bilateral must reflect to some degree upon the utility of
the Bilateral. The Tribunal recognized this when it
stated that:
if any amendment appears appropriate, it can only
be effected following negotiations between the two
6
governments and the conclusion of a new Agreement.1 1
The task of the Tribunal was not to keep the old Bilateral alive and functioning if realism dictated an opposite
result. The Tribunal was asked to find what certain words
meant, and it did. The fact that Italy could not abide
by that meaning reflects badly upon the 1948 Agreement
and indicates that it was a failure.
The French Tribunal settled the dispute by resolving
all the important issues. The Italian Tribunal left open
the issue of how the Italian carrier could exist without
proper equipment. It did not settle the "real" dispute.
Perhaps arbitration is a middle road between negotiation
and judicial decision, and private arbitration is much
1 l6 Italy-U.S.

Air Transport Arbitration, supra note 77,

at 984.
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1 17
closer to negotistion than is institutional arbitration.
If arbitration truly varies depending upon the degree of
formality followed, then the fact that the French arbitrators tended to "negotiate among themselves," while
there was "no compromise whatsoever" among those on the
Italian Tribunal, would tend to explain the different
results.
It is possible that the Italian arbitrators might
have been more "suitable" if the parties had allowed them
to take a liberal approach to the problem. Then they
might have been able to reach an acceptable compromise.
However, is it the function of arbitration to produce
compromises? Does compromise have any place in a "judicial
process?"

IV. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO ARBITRATION
What dispute-settling process is better suited to
international aviation problems than arbitration? To
answer the question, one must speculate on the future
of international aviation.
Experience indicates that arbitration will be
successful in certain situations, as where a limited
number of interested parties are involved. Given the
great number of international carriers, there will be
very few situations in which the number of parties is
limited. In fare and capacity situations, the United
States has recommited itself to the IATA apparatus. Problems will continue because Congress refuses to give
effective regulatory power to the C.A.B. I 1 8 Because of
the great number of interested parties, the sensitive
issues involved, and the ability of foreign countries to
disrupt our patterns of aviation, fare and capacity situations
will probably continue to be areas reserved to the President
for final decision.
1 1 7 Larsen,

supra note 65, at 224.
118In the one instance in which a government tried to
act unilaterally to influence an IATA resolution, the Conference was deadlocked and the Transportation Minister of
Britain, the man who so acted, was forced by Parliament to
resign. This took place during 1958 in Honolulu. Ratemaking ground to a halt. Koffler, supra note 24, at 233.
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American carriers have shown how efficiently and
profitably jets can operate over great distances. It will
presumably continue to be American policy to push for the
lowest fares in order to stimulate greater amounts of
traffic. It has been the policy of foreign governments to
price flights out of the reach of the average person,
to tax those who always fly as heavily as possible, and
to make up the resulting deficit by governmental subsidy.
Advanced technology may change the situation. The
newer jet planes are more expensive and demand greater
outlays of capital. Many countries will never be able to
afford the cost of new equipment. Some European countries
have made attempts to form air unions to compete with
the large American companies. 1 1 9 If costs increase,
the number of international air carriers will decrease
and it is possible that they will become more economically
viable units. Then the airline problem may become more
like other commercial problems and less like sensitive
national policy problems.
As the number of international carriers and competition
decrease, the ability to use arbitration should increase.
Previously, international aviation disputes began over
economic and political differences which were not always
legitimately connected to contract interpretation. The
arbitral process tended to temper the non-legal, non-contract
factors. The legal perspective, which depended on the grant
of jurisdiction, discriminated between the legal and the
emotional issues. Because arbitration is a legal process,
it provides that decisions will be reached on legal grounds.
If the number of carriers remains constant or increases,
then the leasibility of arbitration would seem to be
limited by the many factors which have been enumerated above.
1 19 SAS

serves the three Scandinavian countries. There
has been some discussion that France, Belgium, Germany, and
Italy will form a combine called Air Union. There has
also been discussion that Britain, Australia, India, and
Canada would form a combine which has been termed the Commonwealth Pool. Many of the carriers of the latter group
have joint offices in many cities and offer complimentary
schedules on many routes. Lissitzyn, supra note 5, at 256.
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The present character of international aviation seems to
demonstrate that the older bilaterals which are in use
today--those signed immediately after the war--are inhibiting any progress that could be made. They are outmoded.
Technology has changed to such a great extent that the
words in the instruments are being strained to their
limits. They cannot meet the demands placed upon them.
The "suitable" issues are not present. New bilaterals
should be negotiated to reflect the modern status of
international aviation.
If conditions remain as they are, a suitable alternative
could be the use of a fact-finding board to which the
issues would be submitted. The board could be given a
grant of jurisdiction in the same manner that the arbitral
bodies have been given theirs. Then, once the facts have
been determined, the two parties could sit down to negotiate with an objective determination of their claims before
them. At that point, the political issues could be considered and a realistic final resolution could be reached.
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